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The Remedial Use of Race-Based Redistricting
After Shaw v. Reno
DAVID 0. BARRETT*
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's role in protecting
minorities should consist only in removing barriers to their participation in
the political process. We have seen, however-and the realization is one
that threads our constitutional document-that the duty of representation
that lies at the core of our system requires more than a voice and a vote.
No matter how open the process, those with most of the votes are in a
position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of the others, or
otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account.'
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the section of Interstate 85 in North Carolina which runs
from Charlotte to Durham looks no different than any other roadway passing
through the South's tobacco country. In 1991, however, the North Carolina
General Assembly transformed this stretch of highway into a political
battleground by redrawing its state legislative map.2 In an effort to comply
with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and increase minority representa-
tion in state politics, the North Carolina General Assembly submitted a
redistricting proposal to the U.S. Attorney General for approval. The plan
created one majority-black district centered in the northeast portion of the
state! The U.S. Attorney General rejected the proposal, however, because it
failed to create a second majority-black district in an area of high minority
concentration.5 In response to the Attorney General's request for the creation
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, Indiana
University. Special thanks to Professor John A. Scanlan for his insightful comments and assistance with
this Note. This Note is dedicated to the late Honorable Stanley B. Miller, Indiana Court of Appeals,
Fourth District.
1. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 135 (1980).
2. The state redistricting plan was based on 1990 Census information which entitled North
Carolina to a twelfth seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819
(1993); see also 1990 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION & HOUSING CHARAcrEisTICS FOR CONG.
DISTRICTS OF THE 103RD CONGRESS, NORTH CAROLINA CPH-4-35 at 3-12.
3. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a covered jurisdiction
from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without
approval from either the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988); see also note 82 and accompanying text.
4. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. District 1 has been described as looking like a "Rorschach ink-blot
test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), and a "bug splattered on a
windshield," Political Pornography-II, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14.
5. According to the Attorney General, the North Carolina General Assembly, for "'pretextual
reasons,"' failed to create a second majority-minority district in the southeastern portion of the state.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Appendix to Brief for Federal Appellees at l0a-1 la, Shaw (No. 92-
357)).
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of a second "majority-minority" district in North Carolina,6 and in an effort
to protect several incumbent legislators,7 the General Assembly turned a
substantial section of 1-85 into one of the most uniquely shaped and
controversial political districts in the country.'
North Carolina's newly created Congressional District 12, also known as the
"1-85 district,"9 is approximately 160 miles long and not much wider than the
highway itself for most of its length."0 In describing the peculiar shape of
the district," the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[i]t winds in snake-like
fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas
'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods."" 2 The North
Carolina General Assembly created the 1-85 district in the hope of enfranchis-
ing a large number of black voters who had traditionally been fenced out of
the political process in North Carolina.'3 By stretching the boundaries of
"creative cartography,"' 4 the legislature rekindled an old political debate over
the issue of how far a state may go in redrawing its political map.
Most racial gerrymandering cases involve the creation of districts intended
to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. 5 The North Carolina
General Assembly, however, purposefully created the 1-85 district to enhance
the position of black voters in North Carolina and to ensure them effective
6. A "majority-minority" district is a political unit in a given geographical area where a racial or
ethnic minority group constitutes a majority of the voting age population. This seemingly contradictory
term is often used to describe political districts from which it is assumed that a minority candidate will
win an election over a non-minority candidate. Since this Note deals specifically with a 'majority-black"
district, the terms will be used interchangeably. For a discussion of "majority-minority" districts in
electoral politics, see generally ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION (rev. ed., Greenwood Press 1964) (1963).
7. The'two legislators up for reelection were Representative Charles Rose (D) and Representative
W.G. (Bill) Hefner (D). Richard E. Cohen, Voting Rights Act Could Harm Democrats, NAT'L J., Jan.
4, 1992, at 36.
8. In describing the unique nature of the "1-85 district," one North Carolina state legislator noted,
"'if you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the
district"' Jeffrey Rosen, Gerrymandered: How Justice O'Connor Imperiled Voting Rights, L.A. DAILY
J., Oct. 26, 1993, at 6 (quoting Justice O'Connor quoting an unnamed North Carolina legislator).
9. See id. (describing the "1-85 district"). Appendix A contains a map of the North Carolina
congressional districts, including the "I-85" district, prior to the Supreme Court's decision.
10. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL 2816, 2820-21 (1993).
11. When a state legislature redraws its political map to favor minority groups, the terms "racial
gerrymandering" and "race-based redistricting" are often implicated and are essentially synonymous.
In this Note, the former will be used to refer to instances where the districting scheme is intended to
discriminate or 'fence out" the minority group and the latter will be used to describe remedial
redistricting measures. Racial gerrymandering is generally used as a pejorative based on its historical
derivation and meaning. See also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
12. Shaw, 113 S. CL at 2821 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL
2816 (1993)).
13. For a general disenssion of racial gerrymandering and voting rights litigation dealing with race-
l&ased districts, see Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identij5dng and Remedying Racial Gerrymander-
ing, 8 J.L. & POL. 345 (1992).
14. See The Final Days of Creative Cartography, L.A. DAILY J., May 30, 1990, at 6.
15. See ABIGAIL M. TIERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 63-78 (1987).
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representation in Congress.' 6 As a result of North Carolina's redistricting
plan, a group of white voters brought suit against the North Carolina General
Assembly and the U.S. Attorney General in Shaw v. Reno." In Shaw, the
plaintiffs claimed that the two majority-black districts were created solely for
the purpose of "assur[ing] the election of two black representatives to
Congress" s in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment 9 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In
an interesting case of alleged reverse discrimination, the white voters claimed
that they were being denied an equal voice in the political process by the
intentional creation of the two majority-black districts.2"
In a 5-4 decision, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that
"redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes
of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without
sufficiently compelling justification," states a claim upon which equal
protection relief may be granted.2' Although the Court never reached the
ultimate issue in Shaw-the constitutional validity of the North Carolina
plan--its recognition of a new cause of action represents a conspicuous and
troubling departure from its previous position regarding the remedial use of
16. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (White, J., dissenting) ("[The state effort] involves... an attempt to
equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process.")
(emphasis in original).
17. 113 S. Ct. 2816.
18. Id. at 2821. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had either been
misconstrued by the North Carolina General Assembly, or alternatively, that the Act itself was
unconstitutional. Id.; see also infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
19. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § I.
20. Article I, § 2, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides for the apportionment of representatives
among the states. It reads, in pertinent part: "Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several
States... according to their respective Numbers.... The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct."
Additionally, each state Constitution contains a provision which sets forth guidelines by which the
state's legislature may reapportion electoral districts based on Census data: ALA. CoNsT. art. 9, §§ 197-
201; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-11; ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1; ARK. CONST. Amend. No. 45;
CAL. CONsT. art. 4, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 46-48; CONN. CoNST. art. 3, §§ 3-6; DEL. CODE tit.
29, pt. II; FLA. CONST. art. Il, § 16; GA. CONST. art. 3, §§ 2-3; HAw. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4; IDAHO
CONST. art. 3, §§ 4-5; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 3; IND. CoNST. art. 4, § 5; IOwA CONST. art. 3, §§ 34-39;
KAN. CONsT. art. 10; KY. CONST. § 33; LA. CONST. art. III, § 6; ME. CONST. art. IV; MD. CONST. art.
III, §§ 2-5; MASS. CONST. art. CI, §§ 1-3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2-6; MINN. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2-3;
MISS. CONST. art. 13, § 254; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7, 10, 45; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; NEB.
CONST. art. III, § 5; NEv. CoNST. art. 4, § 5; N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, arts. 9, 9a, 26; N.J. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2-
3; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.Y. CONsT. art. 3, §§ 4-5; N.C. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 3, 5; N.D. CoNsT. art.
IV, §§ 1-2, OHIO CONsT. art. XI; OKLA. CoNsT. art. 5, §§ 9A, 10A, I 1A-E; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6;
PA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 16-17; RI. CONST. art. 7, § 1; art. 8, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. 3, §§ 3-6; S.D. CONST.
art. III, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 4-6; TEX. CONST. art. 3, §§ 25-28; UTAH CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2;
VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 13, 18, 74; VA. CoNST. art. II, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 43; W. VA. CONST.
art. VI; WIS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3-5; Wyo. CONsT. art. 3, § 3.
21. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The Court reversed the judgment of the District Court in favor of the
defendants and remanded the case for a determination of the constitutionality of the district. Id. at 2832.
22. Id. at 2828.
1994]
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race-based redistricting and the need to provide a remedy for past racial
discrimination against minority groups in the electoral process.23
In 1965, Congress provided a legislative remedy for voting discrimination
by enacting the historic Voting Rights Act.24 Congress intended the Act to
restore fairness in the political process and to ensure effective representation
for minority interests in government.25 By amending the Act in 1970,26
1975,27 and most recently in 1982, 5 Congress reaffirmed its commitment to
protecting minority voting rights. Since its inception, the Court has given the
Act's remedial provisions a broad interpretation in order to effectuate the
intention of Congress to protect minority groups from a wide variety of
dilution schemes,29 and most notably, the practice of invidious racial
gerrymandering.3" The Court's decision in Shaw, however, ignores the
congressional intent behind the Voting Rights Act-to promote the enfran-
chisement of minorities in the political process. If the Shaw decision is an
adequate indicator of the Court's current attitude toward voting rights
jurisprudence, it represents an erosion of well-established legal doctrine
promoting the inclusion of minorities in the political process.
The Court's previous position regarding the use of race-based redistricting
permitted state legislatures to create majority-minority districts in order to
comply with the remedial purposes of the Voting Rights Act and to prevent
the dilution of minority voting strength in a given jurisdiction.3 In the past,
in order to challenge the constitutionality of a redistricting plan, the Court
required proof of discriminatory purpose and effect-proof that the plan "was
meant to, and did in fact, exclude an identifiable racial group from
23. Cf Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Rorschach Test for Racial Gerrymanders, LEGAL TIMEs, July 5, 1993,
at 25 ("[The Court's opinion] vindicates the vital constitutional principle that racial classifications are
strong and socially divisive medicine, which should be prescribed only for important reasons and in
careful doses.').
24. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). The
commitment of Congress to providing an effective legislative remedy for past voting discrimination
through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was emphasized in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
during consideration of the 1982 amendments to the Act.
The Voting Rights Act has proven the most successful civil rights statute in the history of
the Nation because it has reflected the overwhelming consensus in this Nation that the most
fundamental civil right of all citizens-the right to vote-must be preserved at whatever cost
and through whatever commitment required of the Federal government.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1982).
25. "(Racial gerrymandering has] caused the political process to degenerate into an uncompetitive,
insiders' game that is incompatible with representative government." John A. Slezak, How Democrats
Nabbed the Ballot Box, L.A. DAILY J., May 30, 1990, at 6.
26. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
27. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat 402 (1975).
28. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982). This Note will focus primarily on the 1982
amendments because of their relation to cases involving racial gerrymandering.
29. Congressional Anti-Gerrymandering Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 596 Before the Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings].
30. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24; see also H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982)
("The Act provides evidence of this Nation's commitment to assure that none of its citizens are deprived
of this most basic right guaranteed by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.').
31. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 160 (1977).
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participation in the political process."32 In Shaw, the Court departed from
these established principles, making it significantly more difficult for states
to voluntarily use race-based redistricting as a means to remedy past
discrimination and comply with the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.33 The Court's decision represents a step backward in voting rights
jurisprudence by frustrating the intent of Congress to open up the political
process and provide "fair and effective representation for all citizens."34
The American political system has undergone a major transformation from
the days of the "black codes," "grandfather clauses," and literacy tests which
once kept minorities from fully exercising their right to vote." It is apparent,
however, that the right to vote does not always guarantee meaningful access
to the political process. This Note will argue that the Supreme Court, in Shaw
v. Reno, failed to follow its own case law precedent in the area of race-based
redistricting and disregarded the intentions of Congress as set forth in the
1965 Voting Rights Act regarding permissible remedial measures designed to
enfranchise minority voters. It will also argue that the Shaw decision
represents unwarranted judicial activism in the absence of any congressional
action regarding the use of race-based redistricting as a remedy for past racial
discrimination. Similar treatment of selected state redistricting plans will only
inhibit certain States' efforts to promote minority representation in the
political process and will defeat the remedial purposes of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
Part I of this Note will present an overview of the Court's response to racial
gerrymandering as a means to deny minority groups an opportunity to
effectively influence the political process. It will also discuss the Court's
treatment of race-based redistricting as a remedial measure used to counteract
various forms of voting discrimination. Part II will examine the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and its effectiveness as a remedy for past racial discrimination
in voting. Part III will discuss the Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno and the
negative impact it will have on the remedial use of race-based redistricting
and the promotion of minority voting rights. Finally, Part IV will suggest that
the Court adopt a position consistent with its previous race-based redistricting
decisions and the congressional intent behind the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
It will argue that the Court should adopt a meaningful standard of review that
takes into account the permissible uses of race in certain jurisdictions which
have a prior history of racial discrimination in voting.
32. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149,
1155 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.l 1 (1986); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 422
(1977); and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)).
33. Id. at 2843-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
35. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823; see also THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH
(1965).
19941
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
I. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE
POLITICS OF EXCLUSION
The art of gerrymandering-redrawing district lines in order to gain an
electoral advantage-is almost as old as the American political system
itself.3 6 Gerrymandering has been described as "[t]he jewel in the
incumbents' crown" because of its potential capability to shield long-term
politicians from successful electoral challenge. In addition to its partisan
use,3' however, gerrymandering has also been strategically used to dilute the
voting strength of minorities-especially blacks-and to prevent them from
attaining an equal role in the American political process.3 9 As Senator John
F. Kennedy noted in 1958, "'[T]he apportionment of representation in our
Legislatures and (to a lesser extent) in Congress has been either deliberately
rigged or shamefully ignored so as to deny the cities and the voters that full
and proportionate voice in government to which they are entitled."' 40
As minority groups gained a larger voice in the electoral process over the
years, their gains at the ballot box were often nullified by the implementation
of "a broad array of dilution schemes," most notably, the use of invidious
racial gerrymandering.4 ' Although minority groups struggled for years to
obtain the right to vote,42 that right lost much of its meaning in light of
redistricting proposals which were designed to dilute minority voting
strength. 3 In dealing with the issue of racial gerrymandering, the Supreme
Court has found itself acting in a dual role by both addressing the position of
36. The word "gerrymander" is defined as a verb, meaning "to divide (a territorial unit) into election
districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral
majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as
few districts as possible." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 952 (1981). Although
this definition commonly refers to political gerrymandering, the same definition applies to a division
of electoral districts based on race. The word "gerrymander" was coined in Massachusetts in 1812 and
was named after that state's governor, Elbridge Gerry. For a historical discussion of gerrymandering and
its comparison to the "rotten boroughs" of England, see ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 23-124 (1907).
37. The 98.4% House, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 4, 1987, at 4 (describing gerrymandering as a
"profoundly antidemocratic device" used by state legislatures).
38. For a discussion of partisan gerrymandering, see DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIO-
NAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-42 (Bruce Nichols ed., 1992).
Leading partisan gerrymandering cases include: Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Karcher v.
Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); and Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aft'd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. ROBERT B. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLmCS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION
35 (1965) (quoting John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAO., May 18, 1958, at 12);
see also Slezak, supra note 25, at 6 ("Ideally, reapportionment should craft competitive districts with
a representative cross-section of political, social and interest groups.").
41. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 6.
42. See WILSON, supra note 35.
43. For a discussion of various responses to vote dilution schemes used to inhibit minority
participation in the political process, see Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
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minority groups in the electoral process and evaluating the Court's own role
in promoting electoral opportunity in the American political system."
A. The Invidious Use of Racial Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of racial gerrymandering in
1960 in the celebrated case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot.Y In Gomillion, the
Alabama Legislature passed a bill which changed the city's boundary lines in
order to exclude virtually all of the black residents of the city of Tuskegee
from voting in local elections.46 The black citizens of Tuskegee challenged
the creation of the new boundaries47 by claiming that the boundaries were
purposefully created to exclude blacks from the political process and therefore
constituted a violation of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause.48 In
a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the black residents of
Tuskegee, by being fenced out of local politics, were effectively denied their
right to Vote in local elections.49
Four years after the Court decided Gomillion, it addressed the validity of
another redistricting scheme, this time in New York City. In Wright v.
Rockefeller,5" the Court rejected the claim of several black and Puerto Rican
plaintiffs asserting that congressional district lines had been drawn on a
discriminatory basis.5 The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
that the New York Legislature had acted with a discriminatory purpose.52 In
Wright, the Court's requirement of proof of discriminatory purpose erected a
high standard which would later prove difficult for minority groups to meet
when challenging the constitutionality of redistricting schemes.
53
44. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L REV. 2121, 2123 (1990)
("[C]onstitutional law is no longer understood as the judicial policing ofwell-defined spheres of powers
and immunities, but as a means of facilitating democratic participation and decision-making.").
45. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
46. Id. at 340.
47. Writing for the majority in Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter stated that the new boundaries
changed the shape of the city of Tuskegee from a square to "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 341. In holding that the act passed by the Alabama Legislature was unconstitutional, the
Court stated: "When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for
special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 346.
50. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
51. Id. at 58.
52. Id. In an oft-quoted impassioned dissent, Justice Douglas argued that state legislatures should
never be allowed to draw district lines on the basis of race.
Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place in a society that honors the
Lincoln tradition---"of the people, by the people, for the people." Here, the individual is
important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The principle of equality is at war with the
notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B
must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so
on.. . . Of course, race, like religion, plays an important role in the choices which voters make
from among various candidates. But government has no business designing electoral districts
along racial or religious lines.
Id. at 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
53. See id at 69 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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The difficulty of proving discriminatory intent became evident in Whitcomb
v. Chavis.54 In Whitcomb, several black residents of Indianapolis claimed that
their voting strength had been diluted unfairly as a result of a redistricting
plan which put them in an unusually large majority-controlled district.5 The
high burden of proving discriminatory intent proved fatal to the plaintiffs'
case. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court finding-that the
black voters of Indianapolis had been victims of discrimination-because the
plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent.56
Before the passage of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the
Court's standard of review in cases involving invidious racial gerrymandering
made it extremely difficult for minority groups to challenge effectively
legislative redistricting plans. 7 Redistricting arrangements could be found
unconstitutional "only if they were intentionally drawn to dilute the votes of
disadvantaged minorities."58 This difficulty in proving discriminatory intent
eventually led Congress to readdress the standard of review for redistricting
cases in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.59
B. Race-Based Redistricting as a Remedial Measure
Although race-based redistricting schemes generally have been used to
exclude minority groups from effective participation in the political process,
in many instances, race-based plans are used to facilitate the enfranchisement
of minority voters.60 In the cases preceding Shaw where the use of race as
a redistricting factor served as a remedy for past discrimination, the Court
generally upheld redistricting plans which did not dilute the voting strength
of white voters. 6' The leading pre-Shaw case, United Jewish Organizations
of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,62 upheld the right of state legislatures to use
race-based redistricting in a remedial manner in those jurisdictions with a past
history of racial discrimination in voting.63'
54. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
55. Id at 129 (Black voters "'have almost no political force or control over legislators because the
effect of their vote is cancelled out by other contrary interest groups") (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 162-63. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas noted the special considerations of
black voters in redistricting cases:
It is said that if we prevent racial gerrymandering today, we must prevent gerrymandering
of any special interest group tomorrow, whether it be social, economic, or ideological. I do not
agree. Our Constitution has a special thrust when it comes to voting; the Fifteenth Amendment
says the right of citizens to vote shall not be "abridged" on account of "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."
Id. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. See BULER & CAIN, supra note 38, at 114-15.
58. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
59. Id. For a discussion of the 1982 amendments, see infra part I.A-B and accompanying text.
60. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. CL 2816, 2843-44 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id.; see also United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
62. 430 U.S. 144.
63. Id. at 159-60.
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The Court in Carey upheld a New York redistricting plan designed to create
black majorities in two electoral districts." The plan divided the
Williamsburgh city district into several separate districts. In doing so, it
divided a community of Hasidic Jews. 65 The Hasidim challenged the plan by
claiming that it "'would dilute the value of each plaintiff's franchise by
halving its effectiveness."'
66
The Court nevertheless upheld the redistricting plan in order to "achieve a
fair allocation of political power between white and non-white voters. 67 In
emphasizing the remedial purpose of the Voting Rights Act, the Court stated:
It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities
in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of
nonwhite representatives from those districts. Nevertheless, there was no
fencing out the white population from participation in the political
processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel
out white voting strength.
68
The Court ultimately held that the New York redistricting plan did not violate
either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments in light of its remedial
purpose. 69 In so holding, the Court created a precedent favoring race-based
redistricting in cases where the strength of minority groups is enhanced while
majority voting strength is not simultaneously diluted or diminished.70
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965:
REMEDYING PAST DISCRIMINATION
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 19657' to protect minority
voting rights and to promote the enfranchisement of minorities in the
American political process.72 Additionally, Congress intended the Act to
serve as an effective remedy for past racial discrimination in electoral
64. Id. at 150-52.
65. Id. at 144. The Hasidic population in the Williamsburgh district was approximately 30,000 at
the time the redistricting plan was enacted. Id. at 152.
66. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
67. James C. Francis IV, Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize
Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.L 571, 577 (1978) (citing Carey, 430 U.S. at 167).
68. Carey, 430 U.S. at 165.
69. In recognizing the permissible use of racial considerations in drawing district lines, the Court
quoted from a previous case:
"[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable
population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any
group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional
representation in the legislative halls of the State."
Id. at 168 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)).
70. Id.
71. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
72. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) ( "The Voting Rights Act was
designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting .. ").
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politics. 73 Several of the Act's provisions were amended in 1970,"4 1975, 7'
and 198276 in order to strengthen its protection of minority voting rights and
as a means for Congress to reaffirm its commitment to electoral equality.77
A. The Act's Remedial Provisions
The remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act-specifically § 5 and
§ 2-provide minority groups with effective weapons to prevent the dilution
of their voting strength and protect their right to meaningful political
participation.78 The Court's broad interpretation of these provisions has
allowed minority groups to combat the use of invidious racial gerrymandering
and defend claims opposing the creation of remedial districts.
79
1. Section 5: The "Non-retrogression" Principle
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, states with a history of voting rights
discrimination are required to obtain "preclearance" from either the U.S.
Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in
order to implement any changes "with respect to voting" in state elections. 0
In Allen v. State Board of Elections,8 the Court held that § 5 applies to both
"tests or devices" that infringe on minority voting rights and also to "electoral
73. The majority in Shaw noted that:
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to
[discrimination]. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access
to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in
several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993) (citing THERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 44).
74. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
75. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975).
76. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982).
77. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
The forthcoming debate in the United States Senate on the Voting Rights Act will focus upon
one of the most important public policy issues ever to be considered by this body. It is an issue
with both profound constitutional implications and profound practical consequences. In
summary, the issue is how this nation will define 'civil rights' and 'discrimination.'
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 108.
This Note will primarily discuss the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act because of their
relevance to racial gerrymandering. The 1970 amendments extended the preclearance period for covered
jurisdictions for five years. Additionally, the 1975 amendments broadened the definition of "test or
device" under § 2 of the Act. For a detailed discussion of these amendments, see id. at 116-18.
78. See Guinier, supra note 43, at 1092.
79. See generally Grofman & Handley, supra note 13.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Section 5 reads, in pertinent part:
[No] voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect [at the time the proceeding was
commenced ... shall be enforced] unless and until the court [finds] that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention
of the [voting] guarantees set forth [herein].
81. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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structures" that have the effect of diluting minority voting strength.82
Commentators have praised § 5 for its effectiveness in preventing the erosion
of minority participation in the political process.
8 3
In order to implement changes in state redistricting plans, a state legislature
drafting committee must prove that the changes "[do] not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the
account of race or color."8'4 In Beer v. United States,"5 the Court held that
a New Orleans redistricting plan did not violate § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
because its enhancement of the position of racial minorities did not dilute the
majority's right to vote based on race.86 The Court emphasized that Congress
intended § 5 to prevent a "retrogression" in the position of minority groups
with respect to their ability to participate in the electoral process.8 7
The remedial use of race-based redistricting is consistent with the non-
retrogression standard of § 5, as set forth in Beer, and its requirement of
proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. The Court previously had upheld
the use of race-based redistricting as a means of complying with § 5 in Carey
stating that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates
any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and apportion-
ment."8 8 Because Congress created § 5 asa safeguard against minority vote
82. Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J.
139 (1984) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)). Racial gerrymandering is
considered an "electoral structure" under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act because of its potential to dilute
the voting strength of various minority groups. Id. at 140-44.
83. The § 5 preclearance provision has been described as "the most effective and efficient
mechanism for preventing voting rights violations." BARBARA Y. PHILLIPS, How TO USE SECTION 5 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT ix (3d ed. 1983).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
85. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
86. Id. at 141. In interpreting the remedial provisions df § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court
concluded that:
It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the
"effece' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of§ 5.
We conclude, therefore, that such an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate
§ 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to
violate the Constitution.
Id.
87. Id. In discussing the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act and the non-retrogression
principle of § 5, the Court noted that:
"Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step
ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones
had been struck down. That practice had been possible because each new law remained in
effect until the Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the burden of
proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory... Congress therefore decided, as the
Supreme Court held it could, 'to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators
of the evil to its victim,' by 'freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the
changes can be shown to be non-discriminatory."'
Id. at 140 (footnote omitted in original) (quoting HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS
AcT EXTENSION, H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 57-58 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 774).
88. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 160 (1977). The Court
added: "Implicit in Beer... is the proposition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject to
the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in
order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5." Id. at 161.
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dilution, race-based redistricting is an appropriate method of complying with
the Act in jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination unless specific
proof exists that the redistricting plan was intended to and has the effect of
discriminating against another identifiable racial group.89
2. Section 2: Looking for Discriminatory Results
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, forbids voting
practices which result in any identifiable group having "less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process."90 The
1982 amendment to § 2 constituted Congress' response to the Court's 1980
decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden,9 which required specific proof of
discriminatory intent to establish a Voting Rights Act violation.92 The
amended § 2 abandoned the "intent test" of City of Mobile and established a
"results'test" which requires proof of the discriminatory effect of a voting
procedure in order to find a violation of the section.93 Section 2, as amended,
makes it easier for minority groups to bring claims of vote dilution based on
the broad language of the provision and its focus on discriminatory effect
rather than intent.94
The City of Mobile decision specifically rejected the holding of Zimmer v.
McKeithen95 where proof of discriminatory intent was not required if an
aggregate of specified factors demonstrated a history of discrimination.9 6 In
considering the standard of review for vote dilution cases, the Court in
Zimmer held that "access to the political process ... [is] the barometer of
89. For a discussion of the failure of race-based redistricting to serve its stated purpose, see Haddad,
supra note 82, at 139 ( "[S]ection 5 has... failed to achieve its potential in eliminating racial vote
dilution.").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Section 2, as amended, reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees [of this Act].
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Id.
91. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
92. Id. "After City ofMobile, the civil rights community centered its efforts on amending the Voting
Rights Act to make the test for racial vote dilution a results test, not an intent test." Haddad, supra note
84 at 139.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
94. One of the main differences between § 5 and § 2 is the latter's breadth of coverage. While § 5
only applies to "covered jurisdictions," § 2 prohibits discrimination throughout the United States. See
PHILLIPS, supra note 83, at 14.
95. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affid on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish
Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
96. City ofMobile, 446 U.S. at 72-73; see also Bernard Grofnan, Critera for Districting: A Social
Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 97 (1985).
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dilution of minority voting strength."97 The Court eventually returned to this
position in 1982 in Rogers v. Lodge,9" when it held that evidence of past
discrimination and effective vote dilution would suffice to prove discriminato-
ry intent.9
The 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles,'00 however, continues to define
how the courts are to interpret the language of the 1982 amendment to
§ 2.101 Thornburg established a definitive three-part test which created a
standard by which § 2 actions are to be adjudicated.0 2 In order to prove a
claim of minority vote dilution under § 2, the Thornburg test requires: (1) that
a single-member district remedy is feasible, (2) that the minority community
is politically cohesive, and (3) that minority candidates can be expected to
lose as a result of their submergence in a racially polarized electorate. 03
The Court's creation of the Thornburg standard, along with Congress'
rejection of the Court's holding in City of Mobile, represented a significant
milestone in the history of voting rights."0 4 The amended § 2 provided the
Court with evidence of Congress' intention to ensure that the ultimate issue
decided under the Voting Rights Act would be "whether the political
processes are equally open to minority voters."0 5
B. Establishing a Standard of Review for
Race-Based Redistricting
The 1982 amendments to § 2 and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act provided the
Court with an effective standard of review to use in race-based redistricting
cases. ' 6 The codification of the results test in § 2, coupled with the non-
retrogression standard in § 5, represent a clear standard by which courts can
examine individual cases of race-based redistricting."7 In its explicit
rejection of the Court's holding in City of Mobile, Congress specifically
97. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1303.
98. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
99. Grofman, supra note 96, at 97-98.
100. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
101. See Grofinan & Handly, supra note 13, at 347.
102. See generally id The first part of the Thornburg test refers specifically to at-large voting
districts as opposed to single-member districts. For a discussion of these types of voting districts and
their characteristics, see generally GRAHAM GUDGIN & PETER J. TAYLOR, SEATS, VOTES, AND THE
SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS (1979).
103. Grofinan & Handley, supra note 13, at 347 n.7 (citing Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30).
104. The decision to amend the Voting Rights Act in 1982 has been called "one of the most
significant issues to come before... Congress." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 1.
105. Id. at 2.
106. In considering the amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Senator Paul Laxalt stated:
In sum, I believe this "objective design" standard is the only theory I have seen which
coherently binds the apparently inconsistent threads of this new section 2 language. It
accomplishes what the drafters of this language say they want to accomplish, and prevents
consequences they say they wish to avoid. It is analogous to classic forms of legal analysis in
our jurisprudence. Finally, it is a logical general formulation of the precedents in the voting
rights area.
Id. at 192.
107. For further discussion of the 1982 amendments, see supra part ILA-B.
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intended for the Court to focus on the effect of the redistricting plan on
minorities rather than the intent of the legislators in creating it.' The 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act established a workable standard of
review for remedial race-based redistricting cases. The standard serves as a
means for minority groups to prove that a redistricting plan has the effect of
diluting their voting power and reducing their opportunity to achieve an equal
voice in the political process. 109
III. SHAW v. RENO: THE DEBATE OVER
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
North Carolina has historically been the focal point of many voting rights
battles. " ' In Shaw v. Reno,"' the Court addressed the issue of how far the
North Carolina General Assembly could go to remedy its history of racially
discriminatory voting practices."' The Court's holding, although it did not
directly address the constitutionality of the North Carolina redistricting plan,
represents a retreat from its previously held expansive view of the Voting
Rights Act. This presents significant problems for states working to remedy
past voting discrimination and provide an equal opportunity for minority
groups to participate in the political process." 3
A. The Case of Shaw v. Reno
As a result of the 1990 U.S. Census, North Carolina was entitled to a
twelfth seat in the U.S. House of Representatives." 4 Currently, forty of
North Carolina's one hundred counties are "covered jurisdictions" under § 5
of the Voting Rights Act."'5 In 1990, the North Carolina General Assembly
was required to submit any proposed electoral changes to either the U.S.
Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for
108. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that
White and the decisions following it, made no finding and required no proof as to the
motivation or purpose behind the practice or structure in question. Regardless of differing
interpretations of White and Whitcomb, however, and despite the plurality opinion in Mobile
that the White [sic] involves an 'ultimate' requirement of proving discriminatory purpose, the
specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory
results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 24, at 205-06 (emphasis added).
109. See id.
110. For a discussion of the history of voting rights in North Carolina, see Robert N. Hunter, Jr.,
Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina, 9 CAMPBELL L REV. 255, 256-61
(1987); see also Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
111. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
112. See id at 2836 (White, J., dissenting).
113. See Richard C. Reuben, Voting Rights in Court: Challenges to Race-Based Districts Could
Shatter Minority Electoral Gains, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 39, 40 ("'[The Shaw opinion] is essentially
a political document in which the Court gives credence to attacks by traditional foes of civil rights, who
have been antagonistic to some of the remedial efforts under the Voting Rights Act."' (quoting Lani
Guinier)).
114. See 1990 U.S. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 2.
115. See id.
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approval." 6 The legislature's initial redistricting plan included one majority-
black district in the northeast portion of the state; however, the Attorney
General objected to the proposal because it failed to create a second majority-
minority district in an area of heavy minority concentration in the southeastern
part of the state. ' 7 After receiving the Attorney General's objection, the
legislature chose not to appeal the decision, and instead, created a revised
plan which included the now-famous "1-85 district."" 8
Five white North Carolina voters brought suit against the North Carolina
General Assembly and the U.S. Attorney General, claiming that the newly
created district violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Although the district court initially dismissed
their complaint,' the Supreme Court presumably accepted the case for
review because of its relevance to prior racial gerrymandering cases and its
potential for clarifying the Court's current interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
B. The Court's Analysis in Shaw
Although the Court never reached the issue regarding the constitutionality
of the North Carolina redistricting plan, it held that the appellants stated a
cause of action upon which equal protection relief may be granted based on
the unusual shape of the district.' 2 ' This holding represented a dramatic
departure from the Court's previous position which permitted race to be
considered as a factor in certain redistricting decisions.'2 2 The Court began
its analysis by examining the history of racial discrimination in the South.'
2 1
In comparing the "1-85 district" to reapportionment schemes the Court had
previously considered, Justice O'Connor stated, "It is unsettling how closely
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c); Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. Most state legislatures opt to submit their
proposals to the U.S. Attorney General for "administrative preclearance," as did the North Carolina
General Assembly, because it is more expedient and less expensive than filing a proposal with the D.C.
Circuit Court ("judicial preclearance"). PHILLIPs, supra note 83, at 6-13.
117. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. According to the Attorney General, the North Carolina General
Assembly's proposal failed to ."give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area'
... for 'pretextual reasons."' Id. (quoting Appendix to Brief for Federal Appellees at lOa-I Ia, Shaw
(No. 92-357)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2821. The North Carolina voters' equal protection claim stated: '[The legislature]
create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated
arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness,
geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions."' Id. (citation omitted). The voters also claimed that
the districts were created along racial lines solely to "assure the election of two black representatives
to Congress." Id.
120. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub noma. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
2816 (1993).
121. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
122. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 160 (1977).
123. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822-23.
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the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of
the past."' 2 4
In addressing the North Carolina plan, the Court applied strict scrutiny
review due to the legislature's use of race as a factor in its redistricting
decision." 5 By doing so, the Court paid particular attention to the physical
appearance of the district and the legislature's disregard of "traditional
districting principles.' ' 26 Much of the Court's decision in Shaw hinges upon
the highly irregular physical appearance of Congressional District 12 instead
of the reasoning behind the legislature's decision to draw such unusual district
lines, namely improving the political position of a large number of minority
voters in North Carolina who had traditionally been fenced out of that state's
political process. 27 Focusing on the physical appearance of the district, the
Court stated:
[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do
matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the. same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.
We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial
stereotypes.' 2
In addition to the Court's objection to the physical appearance of the
district, Justice O'Connor noted that racial gerrymandering may actually
promote the very racial stereotyping that "majority-minority districting is
sometimes said to counteract." 29 In noting that the plaintiffs had stated a
124. Id. at 2824. The Court also noted its longstanding disfavor of the use of race-based
classifications: "Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race 'are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" Id. (quoting Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
125. Id. at 2825 (stating that race-based redistricting legislation "demands the same close scrutiny
[given] to other state laws that classify citizens by race").
With regard to the burden of proof in racial gerrymandering cases, the Court noted that "[t]he
difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive
less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race."
Id. at 2826.
126. Id. at 2826. The Court stated that "traditional districting principles such as compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions [are] important not because they are constitutionally
required-they are not-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a
district has been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id. at 2827 (internal citation omitted).
127. Id. at 2825-27.
128. Id. at 2827 (citations omitted).
129. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that racial gerrymandering threatens representative democracy by
promoting group interests above all else. She stated:
The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is... pernicious. When
a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether
antithetical to our system of representative democracy.
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sufficient claim for relief, the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case
and expressed no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-
minority districts, without more" is always sufficient to state an equal
protection claim. 30
In its analysis of the North Carolina redistricting plan, the Court stated that
"the very reason.., the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of
all racial classifications is because, without it, a court cannot determine
whether or not the discrimination truly is benign."' 3 Consequently, the
Court announced that state legislatures would not be given carte blanche to
engage in race-based redistricting even in the name of compliance with the
Voting Rights Act.'32 The majority opinion concluded that, on remand, the
plaintiffs will sufficiently state a cause of action on which equal protection
relief may be granted if the legislature fails to prove a compelling state
interest for the redistricting plan.
C. A Vigorous Dissent
Four Justices dissented from the majority opinion in Shaw.'33 Justice
White, noting the similarities between Shaw and Carey, stated that no
cognizable claim exists in a racial gerrymandering case where the plaintiffs
"have not alleged a cognizable injury."'34 Additionally, Justice White noted
that "there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the
constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan depends on these twin
elements."'35 Justice White criticized the majority for overlooking the
requirement that there be proof that the North Carolina plan had the effect of
excluding the white voters from participation in the political process.'36 He
stated that the majority's reliance on the district's "irregularities" was an
illogical basis for its decision in light of the fact that "a regularly shaped
district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerryman-
dering as an odd-shaped one."' 37
Justice Stevens' dissent also focused on the majority's concerns with the
shape of the district.'38 Noting both the traditional purpose of the Equal
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2829 (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 2830; cf United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
133. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter all wrote separate dissenting opinions. See
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834-49.
134. Id. at 2832 (White, J., dissenting). Comparing Shaw to Carey, Justice White noted that
"members of the white majority [cannot] plausibly argue that their influence over the political process
had been unfairly cancelled." Id; see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir.
1990) ("Although the showing of injury in cases involving discriminatory intent need not be as rigorous
as in effects cases, some showing of injury must be made to assure that the district court can impose
a meaningful remedy.'), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
135. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2840. (The North Carolitia plan was merely "an attempt to equalize treatment, and to
provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process.") Id
138. Id. at 2842-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Protection Clause in protecting minority rights and case precedent regarding
the role of race in remedying past discrimination, Justice Stevens stated:
Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit
an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the
minority group is defined by its race. The Court today answers this
question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. If it is permissible to
draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for
union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republi-
cans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for
members of the minority group whose history in the United States gave
birth to the Equal Protection Clause. 39
In light of the remedial purpose of the North Carolina redistricting plan,
Justice Stevens implied that the Court should have applied only heightened
scrutiny as a standard of review. 4 ° Similarly, Justice White's dissent added
that the remedial purpose of the newly-created district constituted a compel-
ling state interest in order to satisfy the higher standard of strict scrutiny
review. '4
However, Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, noted the importance of
establishing an intermediate standard of review for all future race-based
redistricting cases. Justice Souter stated:
Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting
decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communi-
ties are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not
result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken
the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny"
to race-based districting decisions. 4"
IV. THE FUTURE OF RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING
AS A REMEDIAL MEASURE
Although the holding in Shaw appears to be limited to the facts of the case,
the Court's decision represents a dramatic departure from its previous
acceptance of race-based redistricting as a means of remedying racial
discrimination in the electoral process. 43 One author has suggested that the
holding in Shaw is that "[t]he remedial use of race can be a factor in
redistricting decisions, but not the only or the overriding factor."'" That
rule is not set forth clearly by the majority's opinion, however. Consequently,
it is likely to "create confusion and invite circumvention" in light of the
Court's previous race-based redistricting decisions.' The confusion over
139. Id. at 2844 (citation omitted).
140. See id. at 2843-45.
141. Id. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting).
143. See supra part I.B.
144. Taylor, supra note 23, at 25.
145. Id.
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Shaw is also likely to create a situation where "virtually every minority
district in the country is now vulnerable to a constitutional challenge."'46
In light of the growing number of redistricting cases litigated each year, the
Court must establish a meaningful standard of review with regard to the
remedial use of race-based redistricting. The Court should draw on its
previous holding in Carey and utilize the standards it had previously set forth
when deciding future redistricting cases. Additionally, the Court should give
greater deference to the intention of Congress to provide state remedies for
past voting discrimination. Finally, the Court must reaffirm its commitment
to the permissible uses of race in certain jurisdictions when states attempt to
comply with the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
A. Requiring Proof of Discriminatory Effect
The requirement of proof of discriminatory effect is a common thread which
runs throughout the Court's decisions dealing with issues of race-based
redistricting. 47 As Justice White noted in his dissent, "there must be an
allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a
race-conscious districting plan depends on these twin elements." 4 s A
requirement of proof of discriminatory effect is consistent with the remedial
provisions of the Voting Rights Act and permits race-based redistricting to be
used in a manner which enhances minority strength in the electoral process
in states where past voting discrimination has hampered the ability of minority
groups to achieve an equal political status with other voter groups.'49 The
majority in Shaw failed to address the issue of whether the North Carolina
redistricting plan, in its effort to enhance the political position of minority
voters, actually had the effect of disenfranchising other white voters. The
Court has previously stated the principle that "mere lack of success at the
polls [fails] to make out a successful gerrymandering claim."'5° Consequent-
ly, a requirement of discriminatory effect will permit the remedial use of race-
based redistricting in instances where other voters are not excluded from the
political process and will allow the Court to fulfill the intention of Congress
when it provided minority groups with the means to protect their franchise by
amending the Voting Rights Act.' In light of the remedial nature of race-
based redistricting decisions, the issue for the Court should be "whether the
146. Rosen, supra note 8; see also Dave Kaplan, Constitutional Doubt is Thrown on Bizarre-Shaped
Districts, CONG. Q., July 3, 1993, 1761, 1762 ("'[lIt opens up every district to judicial attack and review
based on the [district's] lines."' (quoting North Carolina Attorney General Michael F. Easley)).
147. See THERNSiROM, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
148. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2839 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
149. See id at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting) (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); and
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)). But cf Linda Greenhouse, Justices Delve Anew Into Race
and Voting Rights, CM. DAILY L BULL., July 12, 1993, at 1, 20 ("The notion that the failure of a small
minority group to achieve success at the polls cannot indicate a Voting Rights Act violation is at odds
with the theory of the Voting Rights Act.').
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
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classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying equal
access to the political process," and not simply whether race was used as a
factor in the redistricting decision.'52 By limiting the permissible considera-
tion of racial factors in redistricting proposals to instances where a state is
attempting to remedy past discrimination, the remedial use of race-based
redistricting can properly be limited to situations where the remedial
provisions of the Voting Rights Act would apply. In Shaw, however, the Court
failed to focus on the effect of the redistricting plan on the white voters of
North Carolina and, in the process, abandoned a well-established standard in
voting rights jurisprudence.
B. The Permissible Uses of Race
The application of strict scrutiny review in Shaw prevented the Court from
considering the permissible uses of race in electoral redistricting. As Justice
White noted in his dissenting opinion, race may be used as a factor in drawing
district lines so that a state may comply with the remedial provisions of the
Voting Rights Act.153 The Court's use of strict scrutiny, while appropriate
in cases of invidious discrimination, was misapplied in Shaw in light of the
remedial purpose of the redistricting plan. Justice White also argued that race-
based redistricting constitutes a compelling state interest when used as a
remedy for past discrimination. 54 The Court's failure to recognize the
permissible use of race in certain redistricting decisions is inconsistent with
its previous position as seen in Carey and does not comport with the intention
of Congress as envisioned through the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act. 55 Even under a strict scrutiny analysis, a redistricting plan intended to
remedy past discrimination constitutes a compelling state interest in light of
the intent of the Voting Rights Act and its goal of including minorities in the
political process. Thus, such a plan should pass strict scrutiny analysis.
The Shaw Court takes exception with the "highly irregular" North Carolina
district because of its "disregard[] for traditional districting principles.' 56
Although, as the Court points out in Shaw, the principles of compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are not constitutionally
required,'57 the Court's criticism of the physical appearance of the district
and the Justices' failure to acknowledge the district's remedial purpose is at
152. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2845 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that race-based redistricting is an
acceptable remedy when used to prevent racial vote dilution:
[L]egislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting
strength in the districting plans they adopt. One need look no further than the Voting Rights
Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally
be taken into account in order to comply with that Act.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161-62
(1977)).
154. Id. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
155. See Grofraan & Handley, supra note 13; see also text accompanying notes 62-79.
156. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
157. Id.
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odds with the Court's previous acceptance of the use of remedial race-based
redistricting. The creation of Congressional District 12 was, in addition to
serving as a means of increasing minority political strength, an attempt by the
North Carolina General Assembly to protect the seats of several incumbent
legislators.' The Court's attention to the shape of the district, however,
overlooked the benign use of race and the remedial intention of the North
Carolina General Assembly in its effort to comply with the Voting Rights
Act. 159
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White stated that the shape of the district
has little or no bearing on the constitutionality of its creation. He wrote:
"[W]hile district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential
gerrymander, they do no more than that. ... [A] regularly shaped district can
just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-
shaped one."'60 Consequently, by focusing on the shape of the district, the
Court failed to consider whether it had the effect of excluding an identifiable
group-here, the white North Carolina plaintiffs-from the political
process.' Although the North Carolina district may in fact be unconstitu-
tional under equal protection analysis, the Court's failure to apply its
previously accepted purpose and effect test is troubling in light of the
legislative purpose behind the Voting Rights Act.
C. The Court's Re-evaluation of Representative Democracy
In many ways, the Shaw decision represents a "new cause of action '"'62
which leaves majority-minority districts subject to attack without considera-
tion as to whether an identifiable group has been unfairly excluded from
political participation.'63 By ensuring equal access to the political process,
the remedial use of race-based redistricting enhances our system of represen-
tative democracy by enfranchising those voters who have been traditionally
"fenced out" of political society.'64 It has been said that
158. It has been said that "[aill power corrupts, but the prospect of being out of power corrupts
absolutely." (a variation on Lord Acton's well-known maxim). Hearings, supra note 29, at 211.
159. Although Congressional District 12 is a clear example of "creative cartography," state
legislatures often encounter problems when redrawing district lines:
Drawing district lines is not like picking the best-qualified candidate for the job. Communities
of interest cannot be identified with anything like precision; neighborhoods and political
subdivisions are not always compact; districts with vastly different dimensions are required by
the one-person one-vote rule; lakes and rivers get in the way. The inherent messiness of the
line-drawing process ensures that voting districts will always have irregular shapes.
Taylor, supra note 23, at 25; see also Reuben, supra note 113, at 40 ("'The Court spent much of its
capital thundering against the shape of the voting district and none of its ink describing the need to
remedy a century of exclusion. The Court was simply unconcerned with remedying the racial exclusion
of blacks in North Carolina."' (quoting Lani Guinier, professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School)).
160. Shaw, 113 S. CL at 2840 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2839.
162. Id. at 2844 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. See id at 2840 (White, J., dissenting).
164. See eg., Taylor, supra note 23, at 25.
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"[r]acially based districting may segregate voters, but it does so to integrate
legislatures. It responds to the unpleasant reality that there is racial
polarization among both whites and blacks. The best way to read the
majority opinion [in Shaw] is that it saw these tensions and therefore
wanted to put some limit on racial districting without abolishing it."'65
The Court had several opportunities at the end of its 1993-94 term to
address the issue encountered in Shaw.'66 In the cases of Holder v. Hall67
and Johnson v. DeGrandy,'68 the Court continued its erosion of minority
voting rights enhancement in a manner similar to that which occurred in
Shaw. In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Holder rejected the claim brought by
black voters in Georgia that a single-commissioner form of county govern-
ment diluted their voting power under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 69
Although the case differs factually from Shaw, the decision illustrates the
Court's narrowing attitude toward the scope of the Voting Rights Act after
Shaw. 170 In Johnson, the Court ruled 7-2 that Florida minority voters are not
entitled to the largest possible number of minority-majority districts. 171
Although the decision specifically dealt with the issue of maximization of
representation and not the creation of majority-minority districts as in Shaw,
the Court indicated that "there is good reason for state and federal officials
with responsibilities related to redistricting, as well as reviewing courts, to
recognize that explicit race-based redistricting embarks us on a most
dangerous course." 172
165. Id. (quoting Paul Gewirtz, professor, Yale Law School).
166. See generally Greenhouse, supra note 150, at 1.
167. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (involving a minority vote dilution claim from Bleckley County,
Georgia, where no black candidate has ever been elected to a county position).
168. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) (involving a case that arose in Dade County, Florida, in which the
District Court refused to change a districting plan because it could not decide between the claims of
black and Puerto Rican plaintiffs).
169. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2586-88.
170. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion, described the Court's prior
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act as a "disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking." Id at
2592. However, in a separate opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and
Ginsburg, criticized Justice Thomas for his lack of attention to both the intention of Congress and stare
decisis:
Throughout his opinion, Justice Thomas argues that this case is an exception to stare
decisis .... There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve
difficult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an interpretation that Congress has
thrice approved. Statutes require courts to make policy judgments .... Our work would
certainly be much easier if every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary, but when
Congress has legislated in general terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid
difficult questions.... When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly, and consistently
construed for more than a quarter of a century, and when Congress has reenacted and
extended the statute several times with full awareness of that construction; judges have an
especially clear obligation to obey settled law.
Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
171. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2662-63.
172. Id. at 2666.
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CONCLUSION
Race-based redistricting may be used in two ways. It may serve as a means
of invidiously discriminating against minority groups in an effort to deny
them equal access to the political process. On the other hand, it may also be
used to remedy past racial discrimination in voting and serve as a method of
assuring minority representation in government. State legislatures should be
permitted to use race-based redistricting in those jurisdictions where
minorities have traditionally been the victims of voting discrimination in order
to remedy past discrimination in state elections and to comply with the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. The Court's holding in Shaw represents a significant and
troubling departure from the its previous position regarding the remedial use
of race-based redistricting and its interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.
Consequently, Shaw is likely to prevent minorities in certain states and
districts from fully assuming their place in the electoral process due to its
negative impact on the remediation of past discrimination in particular
locations such as North Carolina. Because the Shaw opinion will inhibit the
voluntary efforts of states to ensure minority representation in Congress, the
Court should return to its previous acceptance of the remedial use of race-
based redistricting in jurisdictions where remedial action is warranted.
The "1-85 district" in North Carolina may not survive judicial scrutiny under
previously accepted standards established by the Court. In light of the purpose
of the Voting Rights Act, however, it merits the review it did not receive in
Shaw. Any change in the Act or its purpose must come from Congress, and
in the absence of such change, the Court should not abandon its longstanding
position regarding the inclusion of minorities in the political process and the
use of remedial race-based redistricting where it is necessary to create fairness
and equality in voting.
In order to open up the political process and ensure "fair and effective
representation" for all citizens,'73 the Court must recognize and reaffirm the
permissible uses of race so that states can voluntarily comply with the spirit
of the Voting Rights Act and promote minority representation if they so
choose. In his dissenting opinion in Shaw, Justice Stevens noted that
"[p]oliticians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular
groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district
lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them
from doing so in the future."74
In order to effectuate fully the legislative purpose of the Voting Rights Act,
the Court should return to its previous doctrinal analysis of race-based
redistricting decisions by focusing on whether a newly-created district has the
purpose and effect of reducing a group's access to the political process. If the
question of whether the political process remains equally open to members of
all racial groups can be answered in the affirmative, the use of race as a
173. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
174. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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redistricting criterion should be upheld in districts where past racial
discrimination has diluted the voting strength of a particular minority group.
Although the electoral district in Shaw, and other districts intended to enhance
minority voting strength, may not always pass constitutional muster, it is
essential that they receive proper constitutional review under the well-
established standards enunciated by the Court prior to Shaw.
The Voting Rights Act was created to further the goal of equality in the
political process. Congress has long accepted the remedial use of race-based
redistricting as a means of furthering this goal and satisfying the remedial
purpose of the Act. Just as political parties have historically gerrymandered
legislative lines to place the opposing party at an electoral disadvantage, so
too have certain states placed minority voters at a disadvantage. The remedial
use of race-based redistricting recognizes this political inequality, and in
certain appropriate instances where a state voluntarily wishes to remedy past
voting discrimination, its use should be permitted as a stabilizing and
equalizing factor in the political process as long as access to the electoral
system is left equally open to all voters.
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APPENDIX A
1991 NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN
Source: Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2833 (1993) (reprinted with permis-
sion from West Publishing Company).
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